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FROM SCOPES TO EDWARDS: THE SIXTY-YEAR
EVOLUTION OF BIBLICAL CREATIONISM IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM
Lucien J. Dhooge*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues have generated as much controversy as the scope of
the religion clauses of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution within the setting of the public schools. Indeed, as
Justice Brennan once stated, the courts have "encountered few is-
sues more intricate or more demanding than that of the relation-
ship between religion and the public schools."' This controversy is
not surprising in light of the important role played by the public
schools in shaping the nation's thoughts, beliefs and institutions. It
is a controversy without end; for as long as the public schools
maintain their primary role in educating future generations and
American society moves farther away from the traditional religious
convictions of its forefathers, the controversy will continue.
The teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution has always been a
source of friction between public schools and various religious
groups, mainly Christian Fundamentalists. Fundamentalist Chris-
tians have traditionally viewed the teaching of evolution in the
public schools as an attack on the Bible2 and as responsible for a
* Associate, Dill & Dill, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1980, University of Colorado; J.D., 1983,
University of Denver; Member of Colorado and District of Columbia Bars. The author
wishes to thank Ms. Nancy Moss and Julie Sparks for their able and tireless assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. Fundamentalist Christian writings are replete with statements and accusations regard-
ing evolution's anti-Biblical nature. Fundamentalists have characterized evolution as:
the intellectual basis of all the anti-Christian and anti-God systems that have plagued
mankind for centuries. It served Hitler as the rationale for Nazism and Marx as the
supposed scientific basis for communism. It is the basis of the various modern meth-
ods of psychology and sociology that treat man merely as a higher animal and which
have led to the mis-named [sic] "new morality" and ethical relativism. Its whole ef-
fect on the world and mankind has been harmful and degrading.
H. MORRIS, THE BIBLE HAS THE ANSWER 80 (1971). Although some Fundamentalists believe
that evolutionary theory can be reconciled with the Bible, the vast majority believe that any
reconciliation is impossible.
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variety of societal ills.3 Fundamentalists instead manifest their be-
lief in Biblical (Divine) Creationism.
Biblical Creationism is based on a literal interpretation of Gene-
sis, the first book of the Old Testament.4 "Biblical Creationism
teaches that a [divine creator]-God-supernaturally created the
universe in six creation days."'5 All life forms, including man,
originated in this special creation. Additionally, Biblical Creation-
ism hypothesizes that the earth is only a few thousand years old
and that most of its geological features are explainable in terms of
a Great Flood (Noachian Deluge), survived only by Noah and vari-
ous representatives of the animal and plant kingdoms.e Thus, in
pursuit of this belief, Biblical Creationists have attempted to re-
strict or abolish completely the teaching of evolution in the public
schools.
Creationists' attempts to eradicate evolutionary instruction in
the public schools have taken many forms. Early attempts to pro-
hibit unconditionally the teaching of evolution failed,' as did at-
tempts to characterize evolutionary instruction as a violation of the
free exercise clause. Likewise, attempts to require equal time for
instruction in Biblical Creationism were deemed to violate the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment. The most recent mani-
festation of Fundamentalist opposition to evolution has been in
the form of so-called "balanced treatment acts"" which require
3. Fundamentalists also attribute many of society's problems to the teaching of evolution-
ary theory. Henry M. Morris, a leading creationist writer, has stated that evolution not only
endangers orthodox religion but is "inimical to . . .a healthy society and true science as
well." INSTITUTE FOR CREATION RESEARCH, SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM iii (H. MORRIS public
school ed. 1974). Others have less eloquently accused evolutionary theory of favoring "heart-
less ruffians such as bandits and weeds. An altrusive [sic] person would be less 'fit' to sur-
vive." ASSOCIATION OF NATIONAL BIOLOGY TEACHERS, A COMPENDIUM OF INFORMATION ON THE
THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE EVOLUTION-CREATIONISM CONTROVERSY 35 (on file at the Law
and Education Center, Education Commission of the States, Denver, Colorado).
4. Note, Teaching the Theory of Evolution and Scientific Creationism in the Public
Schools: The First Amendment Religion Clauses and Permissible Relief, 15 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 421, 422 n.11 (1982).
5. Id. at 422.
6. Id. at 423.
7. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
8. E.g., 1981 Ark. Acts 590, §§ 1-11 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to -1670
(Cum. Supp. 1985) (declared unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)); 1981 La. Acts 685 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1
to .7 (West 1982)) (declared unconstitutional in Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (1985),
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987)). Both statutes were entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Cre-
ation-Science and Evolution-Science Act" and provided that if a public school's curriculum
included any treatment of the origins of man, life or the universe, then "balanced treat-
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that the theory of "creation-science"" be taught along with evolu-
tionary theory in the public schools.
The theory of creation-science is based upon a collection of "sci-
entific" evidence which allegedly supports the principal tenets of
creation science; specifically, a sudden creation of the universe and
life from nothing, geological changes and occurrences resulting
from a world-wide flood, and a relatively recent inception of the
earth and all living kinds.10 Creationists divide the scientific com-
munity into two camps: (1) those scientists who believe in the iner-
rancy of the Genesis story of creation and of a world-wide flood as
fact, and (2) those scientists who believe in evolution. Creationists
claim that creation-science is truly scientific and is conducive to
the mental and spiritual health of children as it shields them from
the evils innate in the exclusive presentation of evolutionary the-
ory.11 However, the Creationists' claims to scientific legitimacy
were recently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Ed-
wards v. Aguillard.2 This article will address this most recent re-
jection of equal treatment for evolution and anti-evolutionary reli-
gious teachings within the public schools.
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO Edwards
A. Scopes v. State
The question of evolutionary instruction in the public school
classroom first came before the courts in the much publicized case
of Scopes v. State.13 John Scopes, a science teacher, was convicted
ment" must be given to the theory of "creation-science" along with the theory of "evolution-
science."
9. The term "scientific creationism" was first used in 1965 after the publication of The
Genesis Flood by Henry M. Morris in 1961.
10. ARK STAT. ANN. § 80-1666(a) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
11. Creationists contend that creationism is conducive to the mental health of children
because:
[e]volutionary philosophy often leads to a conviction that might makes right, leading
either to anarchism (uncontrolled evolution) or collectivism (controlled evolu-
tion) .... Creationism is consistent with the innate thoughts and daily experiences
of the child .... He knows, as part of his own experience of reality, that a house
implies a builder and a watch a watchmaker.
INSTITUTE FOR CREATION RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 14.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
13. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The case, dubbed the "Monkey Trial" by mem-
bers of the press covering the story, gained worldwide attention as a battle between the
story of divine creation contained in Genesis and the godless theory of evolution and two
larger-than-life protagonists, Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan.
1988]
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of teaching "a certain theory that denied the story of the divine
creation of man, as taught in the Bible '14 in violation of Tennes-
see's Anti-Evolution Act.15 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court
ultimately reversed Scopes' conviction, 6 the court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the anti-evolution statute.
In construing the statute to prohibit the teaching of only those
evolutionary theories which denied the divine creation of man,1"
the court found the statute to be sufficiently definite to pass the
constitutional void-for-vagueness test.' 8 Furthermore, the court
found that Scopes' dismissal did not violate the law of the land
clause of the Tennessee Constitution, 9 or the due process clause of
the United States Constitution.2 ° The court reasoned that, in order
to maintain control over its employees, the state was not "ham-
pered by the limitations of section eight of article one of the Ten-
nessee Constitution, nor of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."'" Thus, Scopes, as a state em-
ployee, had "no right or privilege to serve the state except upon
such terms as the state prescribed. ' 22 The anti-evolution statute
was thus constitutional as it did not hinder Scopes' right to "teach
and proclaim the theory of evolution, elsewhere than in the service
of the state.
23
14. Id.
15. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts, 27 (repealed 1967). The Act read in part:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Tennessee, that it
shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the Universities, normals and all other
public schools of the state which are supported in whole or in part by the public
school funds of the state, to teach any theory that denies the story of the divine
creation of man as taught in the Bible and to teach instead that man has descended
from a lower order of animals.
Id. § 1, quoted in Scopes, 154 Tenn. at 105, 289 S.W. at 363-64 n.1.
16. Scopes, 154 Tenn. at 121, 289 S.W. at 367. Scopes' conviction was reversed on the
grounds that the one hundred dollar fine unilaterally imposed on him by the trial judge
violated the Tennessee Constitution, which provided that a fine in excess of fifty dollars
could only be assessed by a jury. Id.
17. Id. at 109-11, 289 S.W. at 364.
18. Id.
19. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
20. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Scopes, 154 Tenn. at 112, 289 S.W. at 365.
22. Id. at 111, 289 S.W. at 364. The court further stated that Tennessee could constitu-
tionally require that contracts for public service "be carried out only in a way consistent
with [the state's] views of public policy, and may punish a departure from that way." Id. at
114, 289 S.W. at 365 (quoting Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 256 (1907)).
23. Id. at 111, 289 S.W. at 364. This section of the court's opinion has been interpreted as
allowing a teacher "an unlimited right to believe, but a very circumscribed right to teach
one's belief in the public schools where the state has proscribed such teaching." Nolte, From
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The court also held that the statute did not violate the establish-
ment clause of the United States Constitution.24 The statute did
not mandate the teaching of religious doctrines opposed to evolu-
tion, but only forbade the teaching of any evolutionary theories
that denied the divine creation of man.25 Thus, it did not establish
any tenet of any particular religious belief in the public schools. As
a result, the statute was a constitutional exercise of the state's
power to dictate the content of the public school curriculum."
The Scopes case represents the judiciary's first look into the is-
sue of evolutionary instruction in the public schools. It also repre-
sents the high-water mark for the anti-evolution movement, since
the constitutionality of the Tennessee Act was upheld. However,
the Scopes case gave the theory of evolution wide publicity and
did much to legitimize it. In the public backlash that followed the
Scopes decision, few states enacted similar anti-evolution laws.2 7
Scopes to Epperson and Beyond: Academic Freedom in the Schools, 3 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 37
(1973).
24. Scopes, 154 Tenn. at 118-19, 289 S.W. at 367.
25. Id. In determining that the statute did not unconstitutionally establish religious be-
liefs in the classroom, the court found that:
there is no religious establishment or organized body that has in its creed or confes-
sion of faith any article denying or affirming [evolution]. . . . Belief or unbelief in the
theory of evolution is no more a characteristic of any religious establishment or mode
of worship than is belief or unbelief in the wisdom of the prohibition laws.
Id.
26. Id. In a self-righteous concurring opinion, Justice Chambliss went farther in con-
demning evolution by stating that evolution was:
inconsistent, not only with the common belief of mankind of every clime and creed
and "religious establishment" . . . but inconsistent also with our Constitution and
the fundamental declaration lying back of it, through all of which runs recognition of
and appeal to "God", and a life to come ....
... [The statute prohibits] instilling into the minds of the pupils a denial that he
[sic] is a creation of God, but rather a product of the beast of the field ....
.. . [T]he way is left open for such teaching of the pertinent sciences as is ap-
proved by the progressive God recognizing leaders of thought and life.
Id. at 122-29, 289 S.W. at 368-70 (Chambliss, J., concurring). In a short dissenting opinion,
Justice McKinney found the statute unconstitutionally vague and in violation of Scopes'
due process rights. Id. at 129, 289 S.W. at 370 (McKinney, J., dissenting).
27. Very few state legislatures followed Tennessee's example and enacted anti-evolution
statutes of their own. Oklahoma enacted an anti-evolution act, but it was repealed in 1926.
The Florida and Texas legislatures adopted resolutions against teaching the doctrine of
evolution in the period between 1921 and 1929. The Tennessee law itself was repealed in
1967. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), only Arkansas and Mississippi had anti-evolution statutes in force and effect. There
was no record of any prosecutions under either of these laws. Indeed, as Justice Fortas
stated in Epperson, these statutes were "more of a curiosity than a vital fact of life in these
States." Id. at 102.
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Although Scopes remained viable case law for forty-one years, the
ever-changing interpretation of the United States Constitution by
the federal courts relegated it to the status of a legal anomaly long
before its overruling by the United States Supreme Court in Ep-
person v. Arkansas.28
B. Epperson v. Arkansas
In 1968, after more than four decades of relative quiet, the
evolution controversy erupted once again. In Epperson v. Arkan-
sas,2" the United States Supreme Court declared the Arkansas
Anti-Evolution Act 3 0 unconstitutional as a violation of the estab-
lishment clause. The Epperson case arose out of the following
facts.
In 1928, one year after the Scopes v. State3 1 decision, Arkansas
adopted a similar law prohibiting instruction in the theory of
evolution in Arkansas public schools. In part, the Arkansas Anti-
Evolution Act prohibited public school instruction of "the theory
• .. that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of
animals. '3 2 Thirty-seven years later, in 1965, the Little Rock
School System adopted a new biology textbook which contained a
chapter setting forth the theory of evolution. Susan Epperson, a
high school biology teacher employed by the Little Rock School
System, was thus confronted with the choice of teaching the statu-
torily proscribed material or omitting the offending material in
contravention of the apparent desires of the school system's ad-
ministration. Instead of risking dismissal for teaching the theory of
evolution, Epperson sought a judicial declaration that the Arkan-
sas anti-evolution law was void and an injunction prohibiting the
state and the Little Rock school system from dismissing her. The
28. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
29. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
30. 1929 Ark. Acts 1 (declared unconstitutional in Epperson, 393 U.S. 97). The Arkansas
law was adopted by popular initiative in 1928, one year after the Tennessee Supreme
Court's decision in Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The Arkansas Anti-
Evolution Act read in part:
Doctrine of ascent or descent of man from lower orders of animals prohibited. It shall
be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, College, Normal,
Public School, or other institution of the State ... to teach the theory or doctrine
that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals. . ..
1929 Ark. Acts 1, quoted in Epperson, 393 U.S. at 99 n.3.
31. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
32. 1929 Ark. Acts 1, quoted in Epperson, 393 U.S. at 99 n.3.
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chancery court found the statute to be an unconstitutional state
interference with Epperson's freedom of speech and thought.33
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, finding the stat-
ute to be a valid exercise of the state's power to specify the curric-
ulum in its public schools. 4
In an opinion by Justice Fortas, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court and held that the
statute contravened the constitutional proscription against state
establishment of religion.35 Utilizing the then applicable two-part
establishment clause test devised in Abington School District v.
Schempp,36 the Court concluded that Arkansas had sought to pre-
vent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution for the
sole reason that it was "deemed to conflict with a particular inter-
pretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group. '3 7
It was clear to the Court that "fundamentalist sectarian convic-
tion '' 8 was the sole motivating factor behind the law. This secta-
rian purpose violated the first amendment which prohibits the
states from requiring that teachings be "tailored to the principles
or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. 3 9 Although the
Court recognized Arkansas' undoubted right to prescribe the cur-
riculum for its public schools, it refused to extend this right to en-
compass actions in violation of the first amendment. 40 Thus, after
a tenuous forty-one years of life, the Tennessee Supreme Court's
Scopes decision and the "monkey laws" slipped quietly into legal
oblivion.4 1
33. The chancery court refused to follow the Scopes' rationale on the grounds that to do
so would ignore overriding constitutional values. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 100 n.5.
34. State v. Epperson, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967). The Arkansas Supreme
Court's short per curiam opinion is embarrassingly lacking in legal reasoning, a fact point-
edly noted by U. S. Supreme Court Justices Black and Harlan in their opinions. Epperson,
393 U.S. at 109 (Black, J., concurring), 114 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
36 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The two-part test concentrated on the purpose and primary
effect of the enactment. If either promoted or inhibited religion, then the enactment ex-
ceeded the scope of the legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
37. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
38. Id. at 108.
39. Id. at 106.
40. Id. at 107.
41. In a concurring opinion, Justice Black, after questioning the justiciability of the case,
found the statute unconstitutionally vague, stating that "a teacher cannot know whether he
is forbidden to mention Darwin's theory at all or only free to discuss it as long as he refrains
from contending that it [is] true." Id. at 112 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black contended
that the void-for-vagueness approach was preferable as it allowed the Court to avoid inter-
fering with the states' inherent power to prescribe the curriculum for their public schools. In
1988]
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C. The Post-Epperson Cases
Although Epperson v. Arkansas42 prohibited the states from ex-
cluding the theory of evolution from the public school classroom,4
it did not end the efforts of Creationists to limit the teaching of
evolution and introduce Biblical Creationism into the public school
curriculum. These efforts took three major forms:
[1] claiming that teaching the theory of evolution in public school
science classes would infringe on the free exercise of anti-evolution-
ists' religion; [2] arguing that the theory of evolution was an essen-
tially religious theory, so that presentation of the theory in public
schools would itself violate the establishment clause of the first
amendment; and [3] advocating "equal emphasis" in teaching the
two theories.44
Each of these attempts to circumvent Epperson met with defeat in
the federal courts during the 1970's.4"
1. Free Exercise Contentions
The federal courts addressed the Creationists' argument that the
teaching of evolution in science classes infringed on the free exer-
cise of anti-evolutionist religious beliefs by public school students
in Wright v. Houston Independent School District.46 In Wright,
the plaintiffs, who were students in the defendant school district,
a separate opinion, Justice Stewart also found the statute unconstitutionally vague in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
43. The last of the anti-evolution laws was formally struck down by the Mississippi Su-
preme Court in Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970). The plaintiff in Smith was a
public school student who alleged that Mississippi's anti-evolution law deprived her of the
opportunity to gain a basic educational foundation in science and thus prevented her from
competing with other high school students from other parts of the country on college admis-
sions examinations. The state contended that the Mississippi anti-evolution statute was dis-
tinguishable from the Arkansas statute at issue in Epperson v. Arkansas in that it only
prohibited teaching evolution as fact. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the
statute infected with the same unconstitutional religious purpose that was fatal to the stat-
ute in Epperson. Finding no difference between the two statutes, the court held that "the
Supreme Court of the United States has for all practical purposes already held that our
anti-evolution statutes are unconstitutional." Id. at 698.
44. Note, McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education: Finding the Science in "Creation
Science," 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 374, 379 (1982).
45. Id. at 380.
46. Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afl'd, 486
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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sought to enjoin the district and the state board of education from
including evolutionary theory as part of the district's curriculum
and adopting textbooks which presented that theory to the exclu-
sion of other theories regarding man's origins.41 In part, the plain-
tiffs contended that the theory of evolution was "so inimical to the
Creation account that its presentation as part of the academic cur-
riculum should be deemed a direct attack upon [their] religious be-
liefs by an organ of government. ' 48 Thus, by holding certain stu-
dents' religious beliefs up to contempt, the state had acted to
discourage them in the free exercise of their religion.49
The court rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise contentions on the
grounds that it was "not the business of government to suppress
real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine." 0
The court found that "[s]cience and religion necessarily deal with
many of the same questions, and . . . frequently provide conflict-
ing answers." 1 Although various religious groups may find the the-
ories and answers provided by science offensive, science teachers in
the public schools could not be expected to "avoid the discussion
of every scientific issue on which some religion claims expertise."52
47. 366 F. Supp. at 1208.
48. Id. at 1209.
49. Several authors have contended that the teaching of evolution in the public schools
violates the free exercise rights of those students whose religious principles are not in accor-
dance with the evolutionary theory. Wendell Bird, counsel for the Institute for Creation
Research, has stated that "[p]ublic school presentation of only evolution-science similarly
undermines religious convictions in creation and . . . interferes with . . . parental inter-
est[s] in instilling religious convictions and philosophic beliefs." Bird, Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public Schools: A Constitutional Defense Under the First Amend-
ment, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 159, 197-98 (1982). Mr. Bird contends that the presentation of crea-
tion-science along with evolution-science accomodates the free exercise rights of fundamen-
talist children in the public schools. However, the alleged secular nature and scientific
character of a "science" that purports to remedy violations of the free exercise clause re-
main open to question.
50. Wright, 366 F. Supp at 1211 (quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)).
The facts necessary to prove a remediable free exercise violation have been aptly summa-
rized as follows: "[v]iolations of the free exercise clause are predicated upon a showing of a
conflict between a government action and a sincerely held religious belief central to a bona
fide religion which results in a burden on the practice of that religion." Project, The Lessons
of Creation-Science: Public School Curriculum and the Religion Clauses, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1113, 1115-17 (1982).
51. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1211.
52. Id. In fact, the courts have held that to silence or discharge summarily a teacher with-
out warning because his answers to students' scientific and theological questions were based
on evolutionary theory violates the establishment clause. It has been held that a discharge
for such reasons establishes a religion of orthodoxy and forces teachers "to answer search-
ing, honest questions only in terms of the lowest common denominator of the professed
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The free exercise violations alleged by the plaintiff were too tenu-
ous and lacked the requisite coercive governmental action neces-
sary to invoke constitutional protection.
2. Establishment Clause Contentions
Furthermore, federal courts have also rejected contentions that
the exclusive presentation of evolutionary theory in the public
school classroom violates the establishment clause because "the ef-
fect is to advance . . . evolutionist religions and to oppose crea-
tionist religions."5 The decisions regarding this issue point to the
lack of a state or school district policy regarding evolution or af-
firming its tenets as evidence that the state, by mandating exclu-
sive presentation, has not intruded upon the constitutional princi-
ple of religious neutrality." Denial of relief for alleged
establishment clause violations has also been based on the plain-
tiffs' failure to demonstrate the censure of opposing anti-evolution
viewpoints in the classroom or other coercive actions on the part of
the state or school district.5 The fact that certain textbooks se-
lected by school officials may present a pro-evolutionary bias is
deemed too nebulous an injury upon which to predicate a violation
of the establishment clause.5
3. "Equal Emphasis" in Teaching Evolution and Biblical
Creationism
Furthermore, federal courts rejected several attempts to require
equal emphasis of Biblical Creationism and evolution in the public
schools. Most of these cases focused on state statutes or local
school board policies mandating that any classroom materials
which contained any discussion of evolution should also contain an
equal amount of material devoted to the origins of man as hypoth-
beliefs of those parents who complain the loudest." Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ.,
357 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
53. Bird, supra note 49, at 186. This argument is based on the Supreme Court's opinion
in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the Court said that the
state may not establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing or
showing hostility to religion and thus preferring those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe. Id. at 225 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
54. See Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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esized by other theories.5 7 These "other theories" included the
Genesis account of man's creation contained in the Bible. How-
ever, classroom materials were required to give equal emphasis to
any other theory, exclusive of Genesis and evolution, also deemed
worthy of attention. 8
The courts rejected these equal emphasis arguments on two
grounds. Initially, the courts found that the equal emphasis de-
manded by Creationists for their theories was not truly equal. For
example, several efforts brought before the courts to achieve equal
emphasis not only gave the account of Creation equal time with
evolution but presented Biblical Creationism as the only accepted
theory of origin. Some examples of this pro-creationist bias include
a statute which required that textbooks that taught evolution con-
tain a disclaimer that it was not scientific fact (while creationist
materials were not required to contain such a disclaimer)59 and a
57. An example of such an "equal emphasis" statute is found in Daniel v. Waters, 399 F.
Supp. 510 (M.D. Tenn.), enforcing 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). In part, the Tennessee
statute in question in Daniel stated:
Any textbook so used in the public education system which expresses an opinion or
relates to a theory or theories shall give in the same textbook and under the same
subject commensurate attention to, and an equal amount of emphasis on, the origins
and creation of man and his world as the same is recorded in other theories, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible ....
...Provided, however, that the Holy Bible shall not be defined as a textbook, but
is hereby declared to be a reference work and shall not be required to carry the dis-
claimer . . . provided for [other] textbooks.
1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 377, quoted in Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (de-
clared unconstitutional in Daniel, 515 F.2d 485). The Sixth Circuit found the statute uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that it clearly gave a preferential position to the Biblical version
of creation, as opposed to any account of the development of man based on scientific re-
search, in violation of the establishment clause. The court also held that the statute imper-
missibly entangled the state textbook commission in theological arguments regarding which
theories could be included or excluded from the curriculum.
On remand, the district court rejected the statute on an additional ground, stating that:
the provisions of the statute. . . are patently unreasonable. [T]here [are] a myriad of
recorded theories of creation. Every religious sect, from the worshippers of Apollo to
the followers of Zoroaster, has its belief or theory. It is beyond the comprehension of
this court how the legislature, if indeed it did, expected that all such theories could
be included in any textbook of reasonable size, or even that the authors of such text-
book could know that all theories had in fact been included.
Daniel, 399 F. Supp at 511-12.
Other courts have agreed that "equal emphasis" requirements are unreasonable and, in
practice, unworkable. In Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211
(S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974), the
court stated "[t]o insist upon the presentation of all theories of human origins is ...to
prescribe a remedy that is impractical, unworkable and ineffective."
58. E.g., 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 377, construed in Daniel, 515 F.2d at 488-92.
59. See Daniel, 515 F.2d at 487.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
textbook which demanded "correct" Christian answers to ques-
tions regarding man's origins." The result of this pro-creationist
bias was to give a "preferential position for the Biblical version of
creation as opposed to any account of the development of man
based on scientific research and reasoning."61 This preferential
treatment was held to violate the establishment clause and was
thus unconstitutional.
The second approach adopted by the courts was to find that
equal emphasis requirements were unreasonable and were an "un-
warranted intrusion into the authority of public school systems to
control [their] academic curriculum. ' 62 The myriad of recorded
theories of creation held by all religious sects would place an im-
possible burden on the teacher attempting to instruct students in
this subject."3 Furthermore, in the absence of established stan-
dards, the courts and school personnel were not qualified to select
from available theories those which merited attention in biology
classes. 4 Thus, the equal emphasis approach was rejected as "im-
practical, unworkable and ineffective."6 5
Cases subsequent to Epperson v. Arkansas"6 indicate that courts
have not been sympathetic to the Creationists' claims. Creationist
contentions that the exclusive presentation of evolutionary theory
in the public schools violated their free exercise rights, constituted
a governmental establishment of religion or, in the alternative, re-
quired equal emphasis of their theories regarding the origins of
man, have all met with defeat in the courts. It became evident that
Creationists needed to devise new legal strategies if they hoped to
succeed in their campaign against evolution.
60. Hendren v. Campbell, No. S577-0139 (Super. Ct. Ind. April 14, 1977) excerpts re-
printed in 45 U.S.L.W. 2530 (May 17, 1977). The Hendren case involved a challenge to the
Indiana Textbook Commission's adoption for use in the public schools of a biology textbook
that stressed Biblical Creationism as the only accepted scientific theory of man's origins.
61. Daniel, 515 F.2d at 489.
62. Wright, 486 F.2d at 138.
63. Daniel, 399 F. Supp. at 512.
64. Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1211.
65. Id.
66. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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III. CREATIONISM AND SCIENCE
A. McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education
The new legal strategy devised by Creationists to avoid the con-
stitutional pitfalls of their earlier attempts to introduce Genesis
into the classroom was to relabel their religious dogma as science.
This new theory was introduced as Scientific Creationism. The le-
gal rationale behind Scientific Creationism is quite apparent upon
close examination. If Biblical Creationism, repackaged as Scientific
Creationism, was indeed "science," then it could be taught in the
public schools without violating the establishment clause. Thus,
Creationists had apparently found a way to avoid the objections
raised against their earlier equal emphasis proposals.
Scientific Creationism is an amelioration of "scientific" evidence
collected by Fundamentalist Christian scientists which is believed
to discredit evolution and support the theory that the universe and
all life were suddenly and supernaturally created within the past
ten thousand years. 7 Among the beliefs which creation-scientists
generally adhere to are:
[1] evidence for the sudden, rather than gradual, appearance of
higher life forms in the fossil record; [2] refutation of the evolution-
ary theory that natural selection and mutation are the forces of a
natural progression by the application of the entropy law to dis-
count development from lower to higher order and [the] mathemati-
cal improbability therefore; [3] the existence of distinct plant and
animal kinds as opposed to the evolutionary postulate of transitory
forms; [4] a distinct ancestry for man and apes; [5] explanation of
geologic processes on the basis of catastrophism and a world-wide
flood; and [6] the contention that the age of the earth is recent on
the basis of alternative findings that point to a younger age.68
Other tenets of Scientific Creationism include divine intervention
in the operation of natural laws and the existence of ultimate
meaning and purpose in the universe. 9
On March 19, 1981, the Governor of Arkansas signed into law
Act 590 of 1981 entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-
67. See generally INSTITUTE FOR CREATION RESEARCH, SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM (H. Morris
public school ed. 1974).
68. Commentary, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8 OHIO
N.U.L. REv. 329, 353 (1982).
69. Institute for Creation Research, Impact No. 85, at ii-iii (July, 1980).
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Science and Evolution-Science Act."70 This Act was the first stat-
ute to mandate the teaching of Scientific Creationism in the public
schools if instruction in the theory of evolution was included in the
curriculum."' The Act itself was based on a model act drafted by
Paul Ellwanger of the Citizens for Fairness in Education, a Funda-
mentalist organization based in Anderson, South Carolina.72 The
Act required that Arkansas public schools provide balanced treat-
ment to Scientific Creationism and evolution if either theory was
included in the public school curriculum. Balanced treatment of
these alternative theories was required in all aspects of educational
programs in the public schools.
The statute also contained a lengthy statement of legislative
purpose which, in part, claimed to protect academic freedom and
freedom of belief and speech for students, prevent establishment
of evolutionist religions, and "guid[e] students in their search for
knowledge. '7' Regardless of its stated secular purpose, evidence
adduced at trial indicated that those parties responsible for the
preparation and passage of the Act were motivated by their per-
sonal religious convictions.7 4 Additionally, despite the controversial
70. 1981 Ark. Acts 590, §§ 1-11 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to -1670 (Cum.
Supp. 1985) (declared unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)). Applicable provisions of the Act read as follows:
Section 80-1663. Requirement for balanced treatment of creation-science and evolu-
tion-science.-Public schools within this State shall give balanced treatment to crea-
tion-science and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment to these two (2) models
shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course, in textbook
materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for
the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational pro-
grams in public schools ....
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1663.
71. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West Supp. 1982).
72. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261. Ellwanger's purpose in drafting the model act was
demonstrably religious, as he envisioned the eventual removal of evolution, a forerunner of
such societal ills as Nazism, racism and abortion, from the public school curriculum and its
replacement with Scientific Creationism. Id. at 1261.
73. 1981 Ark. Acts 590, § 7 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1669); see also Note, supra note
44, at 382-83.
74. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261-63. In a letter to State Senator Bill Keith of Louisiana,
Ellwanger stated that he viewed the creationism/evolution controversy as a "battle. .. be-
tween God and anti-God forces . . . . [lit behooves Satan to do all he can to thwart our
efforts and confuse the issue at every turn." Id. at 1261. Ellwanger's ultimate goal appeared
to be the "killing [of] evolution instead of playing these debating games that we've been
playing for nigh over a decade already." Id. at 1262.
The sponsor of the Act, Senator James L. Holsted, was also found to have been motivated
by his religious convictions in his sponsorship of the Act. Specifically, Senator Holsted testi-
fied that he held to a literal interpretation of the Bible, that the Act was compatible with
and favorable to his religious beliefs, and that his religious convictions were a factor in his
sponsorship of the Act. Id. at 1263 n.14.
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nature of the Act, it was passed by the Arkansas Senate after only
a few minutes of debate and by the Arkansas House of Representa-
tives following a perfunctory fifteen minute hearing. 5 No scientists
or representatives of the State Department of Education were
called to testify at this hearing.71
The Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act was immediately chal-
lenged in federal court. Applying the three-pronged establishment
clause test stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,77 the district court found
that the primary purpose of the statute was to introduce the Bibli-
cal version of creation into the public school curricula.71 The court
also found that the primary effect of the statute was to advance
the religious views of Biblical Creationists, 7 and that the constant
monitoring of teachers and course materials necessary to ensure
proper presentation excessively entangled the government with re-
ligion. 0 Therefore, the statute was held to violate all three prongs
of the establishment clause test set forth in Lemon.
Consistent with the mandate of Lemon, the court first consid-
ered the primary purpose of the Act.8 In order to be deemed con-
sistent with the dictates of the establishment clause, the statute
under examination must have a secular legislative purpose.2 The
court examined the lengthy legislative statement of the purported
purpose of the Act, but refused to be bound by such statements of
purpose and disclaimers. Instead, the court considered the histori-
cal context of the Act, the sequence of events leading up to the
passage of the Act, departures from normal legislative procedures
and contemporaneous statements of the legislative sponsor in de-
termining the true legislative purpose of the Act.8 3 The court con-
cluded that the only inference that could be drawn was that the
75. Id. at 1262-63.
76. Id. at 1263.
77. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The establishment clause test articulated by the Court in Lemon
.states, in part, that: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ....
[F]inally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
78. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264.
79. Id. at 1272.
80. Id. The court held that, under the statute, the state would be required to monitor its
teachers closely to prevent religious references in the classroom and make delicate religious
judgments. Id.
81. Id. at 1263.
82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
83. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1263-64.
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Act was passed for the specific purpose of advancing Fundamental-
ist Christian beliefs.84
Specifically, the court noted that the Act's author, Paul
Ellwanger, had, on several occasions, publicly proclaimed the sec-
tarian purpose of the proposal. Additionally, the legislative sponsor
of the Act, Senator James L. Holsted, had also stated that his
sponsorship and lobbying efforts on behalf of the Act were moti-
vated solely by his religious convictions and that the Act favored
the position of those adhering to a literal interpretation of the Bi-
ble.85 Although these statements were not solely determinative,
when combined with the lack of any legislative investigation, de-
bate or consultation with educators and scientists, the intrusive
nature of the Act into the school curriculum and the historical hos-
tility of the State of Arkansas to evolutionary instruction, the
court concluded that the legislature's lengthy statement of secular
purpose was self-serving, and had little, if any, support in fact.
Thus, the court reasoned that the Act was "purely an effort to in-
troduce the Biblical version of creation into the public school cur-
ricula"'8 6 and, as such, did not have a secular legislative purpose as
required by the first prong of the Lemon test.
The court also found that the primary effect of the Act was to
advance the religious views of Biblical Creationists. In determining
that the primary effect of the Act was the impermissible advance-
ment of religion, the court focused on the definition of creation-
science contained in section 4(a) of the Act.8 7 Section 4(a) of the
Act defined creation-science as:
[T]he scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate: (1)
sudden creation of the universe, energy and life from nothing; (2)
the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about
development of all living kinds from a single organism; (3) changes
only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and ani-
mals; (4) separate ancestry for man and apes; (5) explanation of the
earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a
world wide flood; and (6) a relatively recent inception of the earth
and living kinds.88
84. Id. at 1264.
85. Id. at 1263 n.14.
86. Id. at 1264.
87. Id. at 1264-68.
88. Id. 1981 Ark. Acts 590, § 4(a) (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1666(a)).
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Initially, the court concluded that section 4(a) was "unquestion-
ably a statement of religion."89 The definition of creation-science
contained in section 4(a) had, as its unmentioned reference, the
first eleven chapters of the Book of Genesis. The court noted that
the principal tenets of creation-science, as defined in section 4(a),
such as sudden creation of life from nothing,90 the destruction of
the world by a flood of divine origin,9 the use of the term "kinds"
in classifying plants and animals,92 a relatively recent inception of
the earth93 and the separate ancestry of man and ape,94 closely par-
alleled the account of creation contained in the Book of Genesis.
The theory of creation contained in section 4(a) was deemed
unique to Genesis and was, in fact, the Christian Fundamentalist
interpretation of Genesis. Thus, the court concluded that the defi-
nition of creation-science contained in section 4(a) was identical to
the literal interpretation of Genesis adhered to by Christian Fun-
damentalists and, consequently, had as its primary effect the ad-
vancement of their particular religious beliefs.9 5
Additionally, in the most controversial portion of its opinion, the
court determined that creation-science was not in fact science.9 6
'89. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265.
90. The court noted that the terminology "sudden creation from nothing" was taken di-
rectly from Chapter 1, verses 1-10 of Genesis. Id. at 1265 n.19.
91. Id. at 1265 n.19. The court found this concept "peculiar to Judeo-Christian tradition
and ... based on Chapters 7 and 8 of Genesis." Id.
92. Id. The testimony of scientific witnesses at trial established that the term "kinds" has
"no fixed scientific meaning, but appears repeatedly in Genesis." Id.
93. This term apparently refers to the Creationist teaching that places the age of the
earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years based on the genealogy of the Old Testament.
94. Id. The court concluded that this portion of the creation-science theory focused on
"the portion of the theory of evolution which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Id.
95. Id. at 1266.
96. McLean represents the first case in which a court developed a legal definition of sci-
ence. The opinion has been attacked on the ground that it was not necessary for the court to
define science in order to resolve the case. See Lines, Scientific Creationism in the Class-
room: A Constitutional Dilemma, 28 Loy. L. REV. 35, 50 (1982). The possibility of strict
definitions of subjects in the public school curriculum which could exclude topics worthy of
study is the principal objection to the court's definitioil. Despite this danger, it was neces-
sary for the court to define science and apply this definition to Scientific Creationism.
In its findings of fact, the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act contained the following
statement: "Public school presentation of... creation-science would not violate the Consti-
tution's prohibition against establishment of religion, because it would involve presentation
of... scientific evidences and related inferences ... rather than any religions [sic] instruc-
tion." AR STAT. ANN. § 80-1669(k). The statute's constitutionality depended on the asser-
tion that because creation-science was not religious in nature, but was in fact a scientific
theory, its instruction in the public schools did not violate the establishment clause. Thus, it
was necessary for the court to define science in order to determine the nature of Scientific
Creationism and, consequently, its constitutional status in the classroom.
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Judge Overton's opinion set forth a five-part definition of science
and, applying this definition to creation-science, concluded that it
lacked legitimate educational value.97 According to the court, sci-
ence is "what is 'acceptable by the scientific community'"98 and is
"what scientists do."9 More precisely, the essential characteristics
of science, as determined by the court, were: "(1) [i]t is guided by
natural law; (2) [i]t has to be explanatory by reference to natural
law; (3) [i]t is testable against the empirical world; (4) [i]ts conclu-
sions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word, and (5)
[i]t is falsifiable."' 100 Applying this definition to the definition of
creation-science contained in section 4(a) of the Act, the court
found that several of the tenets of creation-science were inconsis-
tent with scientific methodology as encompassed within its
definition.
Specifically, the primary foundation of creation-science, the sud-
den creation of the universe from nothing, was deemed by the
court to be unscientific because of its dependency upon supernatu-
ral intervention which is not explainable by reference to natural
law, is not testable and is not falsifiable. This reasoning was
equally applicable to that portion of the Act which attempted to
attribute the earth's geology to catastrophism including the occur-
rence of a worldwide flood. This worldwide flood was conceded by
the witnesses testifying on behalf of creation-science to be the No-
achian Flood described in the Book of Genesis. 101 Additionally, the
witnesses conceded that any kind of Genesis flood was entirely de-
pendent upon supernatural intervention. 10 2 Thus, as with the con-
cept of sudden creation from nothing, this facet of creation-science
was not guided or explainable by reference to natural law.
The court also found that terminology used in the definition of
creation-science had no scientific meaning. Specifically, the word
"kinds," as used in that section of the Act which attempts to dis-
credit the concept of genetic mutation and adaptation, has no sci-
entific definition but, in fact, appears repeatedly in Genesis. 03 Ad-
97. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1268.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1267-68. The relevant portion of Genesis referred to by the court states: "And
God said 'Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds'." Genesis 1:24
(Revised Standard Version).
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ditionally, the term "relatively recent inception of the earth," as
used in section 4(a)(6) of the Act, has no scientific meaning.' In-
stead, it can only be given meaning by reference to creationist
writings which place the age of the earth at between 6,000 and
10,000 years based upon the genealogy of the Old Testament. 05
The court also found the statement contained in section 4(a)(4) of
the Act regarding the separate ancestry of man and apes to be a
"bald assertion" without scientific meaning or reference to any sci-
entific fact or theory.10 6
Creation-science, as defined in section 4(a), "not only fails to fol-
low the canons defining scientific theory, [but] it also fails to fit
the more general descriptions of 'what scientists think' and 'what
scientists do.' ,,107 The court found a complete lack of recognition
for the creation-science theory described in section 4(a) within the
scientific community. 0 8 Although this lack of acceptance could be
attributed to narrow-mindedness on behalf of the scientific com-
munity, the court found it inconceivable that such a group of inde-
pendent thinkers as modern scientists would or could so effectively
censor new scientific thought. 0 9
The court concluded its analysis of creation-science by stating
that the methods employed by creation-scientists and theoreticalimmutability of creation-science were inconsistent with modern
scientific methodology. 10 The methods utilized by creationists did
not take data gathered through observation and experimentation,
weigh it against opposing data, and thereafter reach the conclu-
sions set forth in the Act. Instead, creationists adopted the "literal
wording of the Book of Genesis and attempt[ed] to find scientific
support for it.""' The court determined that such attempts con-
104. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265.
105. Id. at 1268.
106. Id. The court found the sole basis of this assertion to be the traditional offensiveness
to creationists of the evolutionary notion that man and modern apes have a common ances-
try. Id. at 1268 n.26.
107. Id. at 1268.
108. Id.
109. This portion of the court's opinion fails to recognize the historical censorship and
inflexibility of science to new and "radical" thought. Although it may be contended that
modern scientists as a community tend to be more open-minded and less dogmatic than
their predecessors, history is littered with examples of scientific intolerance of new thought.
One need only recall the examples of Nicholas Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, William Harvey
and Charles Darwin himself to conclude that scientists are perhaps no more open-minded
than the society in which they operate.
110. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1268-69.
111. Id. at 1269.
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sisted almost entirely of attacks on evolution through "a rehash of
data and theories which have been before the scientific community
for decades.""' 2 Additionally, the court condemned the creationist
method of inquiry which deemed any evidence inconsistent with
evolution to become automatically "scientific evidence" for the
theory of creation-science." 3 The court concluded that this meth-
odology of attempting to prove creation-science solely by attacking
evolution was not based on natural law and, thus, was
unscientific." 4
Furthermore, the court condemned as unscientific the immuta-
ble conclusions drawn by creationists through the use of this meth-
odology. The court stated that scientific theories must be "tenta-
tive and always subject to revision or abandonment" in light of
factual inconsistencies."" As creationists begin with complete faith
in their literal interpretation of Genesis and refuse to change their
theory regardless of the evidence developed during the course of
their investigation, such theories lack the flexibility and adaptabil-
ity of scientific theories. These rigid beliefs were deemed to resem-
ble more closely the tenets of religious dogma rather than the
open-minded spirit of inquiry characteristic of the scientific
method."
6
Based upon the failure of creation-science as defined in section
4(a) of the Act to meet the court's definition of science, the court
concluded that creation-science was not science."' Consequently,
the court found that the only real effect of the Act was the ad-
vancement of the religious beliefs of Fundamentalist Christians. As
such, the Act failed the second portion of the Lemon test."'
Finally, the court considered the issue of whether the statute im-
permissibly fostered an excessive governmental entanglement with
112. Id. at 1270.
113. Id. at 1269. For example, creationists contend that the mathematical probability of a
chemical combination resulting in life from non-life is astronomical and beyond belief. Since
this remote probability may be inconsistent with evolutionary theory, it thus becomes "sci-
entific evidence" for their theory that life was the product of a creator. Id. However, the
"leap of faith" required to interpret this "evidence" as indicative of sudden creation from
nothing without any additional evidentiary basis is difficult at best and one that this author
would not care to make.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1268-69.
116. Id. at 1269.
117. Id. at 1267.
118. See supra note 77.
[Vol. 22:187
FROM Scopes TO Edwards
religion."" Although the Act did not explicitly mandate interven-
tion by the state in matters of public school curricula, the court
deemed compliance impossible without a reevaluation of a multi-
plicity of subjects presently taught in the public schools. 120 Such a
reevaluation would require constant monitoring of materials by the
Arkansas State Department of Education to avoid the use of reli-
gious references and would consequently require state officials to
make delicate religious judgments.' 2 ' The need to monitor class-
room materials and course content in order to uphold the Act's
prohibition against religious instruction was deemed necessarily to
involve school administrators in questions concerning religion. The
court concluded that this involvement of state officials in religious
issues created an excessive entanglement with religion.12
The McLean opinion represents the judiciary's first contact with
the religious theory of Biblical Creationism reconstituted as the
nonsectarian theory of creation-science. The novelty of this re-
packaging does not, however, excuse the overbreadth which charac-
terizes the court's opinion. In its eagerness to analyze each and
every aspect of the Act thoroughly, the McLean court ignored the
dangers inherent in strictly defining subjects within the public
school curricula and perhaps overestimated the open-mindedness
and flexibility of modern scientists. Consequently, the opinion is
not a model of judicial restraint. However, despite the McLean
court's apparent intention to the contrary, its opinion has not be-
come the basis for future resolution of disputes involving the roles
of creationism and evolution in the public school curricula. In-
stead, this distinction was left to the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court in the
cases of Aguillard v. Edwards2 3 and Edwards v. Aguillard.124
119. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court did, however, reject plaintiff's contention that the term "balanced
treatment" was unconstitutionally vague. The word "balanced" was found to have a reason-
ably accepted understanding. Id. at 1273. Finally, the court dismissed the defendants' argu-
ment that evolution is a religion and, as such, evolutionary instruction infringes on the free
exercise rights of students whose religious beliefs are inconsistent with evolution. Evolution
was deemed not to be a religion and, even assuming it was, the appropriate remedy was to
prohibit the teaching of evolution and not establish opposing religions such as creation-
science. In any case, the court failed to see how the teaching of a purported science such as
creation-science neutralized the religious nature of evolution. Id. at 1274.
123. 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
124. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
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IV. CREATIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
Edwards v. Aguillard
A. Introduction
Despite the definitive nature of the court's opinion in McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education,25 the creation-science controversy
returned to the courts in Edwards v. Aguillard.12' This case in-
volved a challenge by educators, religious leaders and parents of
public school children to the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-
Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act"
enacted in 1981 by the Louisiana legislature. 27 In essence, the
statute required the teaching of creation-science in Louisiana pub-
lic schools whenever students were instructed in evolution. 128
After a somewhat tortured procedural course, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana declared the
law to be unconstitutional pursuant to the purpose and effect
prongs of the establishment clause test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.29 A divided Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision, but restricted its affirmation to finding
the purpose of the statute to be the promotion of the religious be-
liefs of Christian Fundamentalists. 130 An appeal was taken to the
United States Supreme Court which reentered the creationism/
evolution controversy for the first time since its decision in Epper-
son v. Arkansas'3' nineteen years earlier. In Edwards v. Aguillard,
a divided court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and held that the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act vio-
lated the purpose prong of the tripartite establishment clause test
set forth in Lemon. 32 In order to understand fully the ramifica-
tions of this opinion for public school curricula nationwide, it is
first necessary to examine closely the provisions of the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment Act' 3 and the Fifth Circuit's decision declar-
ing the Act to be an impermissible establishment of religion.
125. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
126. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
127. Id. at 2574.
128. See Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 428 (E.D. La. 1985) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
129. 403 U.S. 602.
130. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1253 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987).
131. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
132. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578.
133. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West 1982).
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B. The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolu-
tion-Science in Public School Instruction Act
The "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act" was enacted in 1981 by
the Louisiana legislature as an addition to Louisiana's general
school law applicable to all public, secondary and elementary
schools."" Although the Act does not require public school instruc-
134. L&. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West 1982). The full text of the statute is set
forth below.
BALANCED TREATMENT FOR CREATION-SCIENCE AND EVOLUTION-SCI-
ENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INSTRUCTION.
Section 286.1. Short Title
This Subpart shall be known as the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act."
Section 286.2. Purpose
This Subpart is enacted for the purposes of protecting academic freedom.
Section 286.3. Definitions
As used in this Subpart, unless otherwise clearly indicated, these terms have the
following meanings:
(1) "Balanced treatment" means providing whatever information and instruction
in both creation and evolution models the classroom teacher determines is necessary
and appropriate to provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks and
other instructional materials available for use in his classroom.
(2) "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and inferences
from those scientific evidences.
(3) "Evolution-science" means the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences
from those scientific evidences.
(4) "Public schools" means public secondary and elementary schools.
Section 286.4. Authorization for balanced treatment; requirement for
nondiscrimination
A. Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools within this state
shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced
treatment of these two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole
for each course, in textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library
materials taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities,
and in other educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such lectures,
textbooks, library materials, or educational programs deal in any way with the subject
of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation or evolution is
taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven scientific fact.
B. Public schools within this state and their personnel shall not discriminate by
reducing a grade of a student or by singling out and publicly criticizing any student
who demonstrates a satisfactory understanding of both evolution-science or creation-
science and who accepts or rejects either model in whole or part.
C. No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or instructor in any state-
supported university in Louisiana, who chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach
scientific data which points to creationism shall, for that reason, be discriminated
against in any way by any school board, college board, or administrator.
Section 286.5. Clarifications
This Subpart does not require any instruction in the subject of origins but simply
permits instruction in both scientific models (of evolution-science and creation-sci-
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tion in the origins of mankind, section 286.4 requires that the pub-
lic schools give "balanced treatment" to creation-science and
evolution if they choose to instruct students in the theories of
human origin. The balanced treatment requirement is not only ap-
plicable to materials regarding mankind's origins utilized in science
courses, but to all materials of any nature discussing this topic
which are utilized in any educational program.'85 This balanced
treatment requirement would presumably include all science, hu-
manities, history, philosophy and literature courses within its
scope.
The terms "balanced treatment," "creation-science" and "evolu-
tion-science" are all defined in the Act in simple terms. 136 In this
respect, the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act is far different
from the Arkansas version of the same act. Unlike the Arkansas
Act, the Louisiana Act does not set forth elaborate definitions of
"creation-science" and "evolution-science.' ' 37 The principal beliefs
and characteristics of creationism and evolution are absent from
the Louisiana Act. Instead, "creation-science" and "evolution-sci-
ence" are defined only as the "scientific evidences for [each theory]
ence) if public schools choose to teach either. This Subpart does not require each
individual textbook or library book to give balanced treatment to the models of
evolution-science and creation-science; it does not require any school books to be dis-
carded. This Subpart does not require each individual classroom lecture in a course
to give such balanced treatment but simply permits the lectures as a whole to give
balanced treatment; it permits some lectures to present evolution-science and other
lectures to present creation-science.
Section 286.6. Funding for inservice training and materials acquisition
Any public school that elects to present any model of origins shall use existing
teacher inservice training funds to prepare teachers of public school courses present-
ing any model of origins to give balanced treatment to the creation-science model and
the evolution-science model. Existing library acquisition funds shall be used to
purchase nonreligious library books as are necessary to give balanced treatment to
the creation-science model and the evolution-science model.
Section 286.7. Curriculum Development
A. Each city and parish school board shall develop and provide to each public
school classroom teacher in the system a curriculum guide on presentation of crea-
tion-science.
B. The governor shall designate seven creation-scientists who shall provide re-
source services in the development of curriculum guides to any city or parish school
board upon request. Each such creation-scientist shall be designated from among the
full-time faculty members teaching in any college or university in Louisiana. These
creation-scientists shall serve at the pleasure of the governor and without
compensation.
135. Id. at § 17:286.4(a).
136. Id. at § 17:286.3.
137. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1666 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
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and inferences from those scientific evidences."' 38 Consequently, a
court analyzing the definition of "creation-science" as set forth in
the Louisiana Act would presumably be unable to equate creation-
science with the Biblical account of creation contained in the Book
of Genesis as easily as the McLean court did in its analysis of the
Arkansas Act.' 39 These broad definitions of "creation-science" and
"evolution-science" could also be interpreted to include all known
theories of creation within their scope and thus be deemed to be
"religion and science neutral" with regard to differing theories. 40
In fact, these definitions are so nebulous that their interpretation
and implementation in the classroom would most likely become a
matter of individual teacher preference. The public school teacher
would not be required to teach any particular theory of creation or
evolution, but would only be required to give those theories of cre-
ation equal treatment with theories of evolution-science.
Although the court in McLean found that the term "balanced
treatment" had a reasonably acceptable understanding and was
thus not unconstitutionally vague, the Louisiana legislature, unlike
the Arkansas legislature, included a definition of the term within
its Act. Specifically, "balanced treatment" is defined to include any
"information and instruction in both the creation and evolution
models that the classroom teacher determines is necessary and ap-
propriate to provide insight into both theories .. '.. ,' The
materials to be used in effectuating the requirements of the statute
are a matter of individual teacher choice. " 2 Once again, the inter-
pretation and implementation of this requirement in the classroom
would most likely differ from classroom to classroom, dependent
upon the individual teachers' preferences.
The Louisiana and Arkansas versions of the Balanced Treatment
138. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.3(2)-(3).
139. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
140. Although the statute could be deemed to be "religion neutral" by not specifically
identifying "creation-science" with the account of creation contained in Genesis, it would
still require constant monitoring of materials to avoid religious references. As in McLean,
the need to monitor course content in order to prevent religious instruction would necessa-
rily involve school administrators in questions concerning religion. Additionally, as recog-
nized by the courts in Daniel v. Waters, 399 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Tenn.), enforcing 515 F.2d
485 (6th Cir. 1975), and Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974), equal em-
phasis on all theories of creation is unreasonable and unworkable due to the multiplicity of
theories and the inherent religious nature of several of these theories. See supra note 57.
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3(1).
142. Id. See generally, McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1273.
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Act are, however, similar in their purported legislative purpose. As
with the Arkansas Act, the legislative history of the Louisiana Act
contained lengthy testimonial avowals of secular purpose by the
Act's sponsor and supporters. Although the Louisiana Act did not
purport to protect the freedom of belief and speech for students
and prevent the establishment of evolutionist religions, section
286.2 of the Act stated that it was enacted for the specific purpose
of protecting academic freedom in the public schools. 143 As in Mc-
Lean, this statement of a purported secular purpose underlying the
Act proved crucial to the judiciary's resolution of the constitution-
ality of the Act.
C. Aguillard v. Edwards
The Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act144 immediately became
the subject of federal litigation. The Act was challenged by oppo-
nents as an unconstitutional establishment of religion in violation
of the first amendment. Conversely, the Act's sponsor and other
proponents initiated an action seeking a judgment declaring the
Act constitutional and an injunction to enforce its provisions. As a
result, the district court stayed the action challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Act, pending a resolution of the declaratory judg-
ment action initiated by the Act's supporters. 45
As a result of the complexities of the procedural issues, the ulti-
mate resolution of the establishment clause contentions of the
Act's opponents was delayed for over two and one-half years.
143. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2.
144. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1 to .7 (West 1982).
145. The action initiated by the Act's sponsor and supporters was ultimately dismissed
for failure to establish federal question and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331-1332 (1982). Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., 553 F. Supp. 295, 296 (M.D. La. 1982).
The district court found that the complaint, as stated, involved a dispute which should be
resolved by the Louisiana state courts. Id. at 297. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1982), did not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Keith, 553 F.
Supp. at 300. Finally, the court rejected the asserted ground for federal jurisdiction based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 due to the lack of complete diversity between the plaintiffs and the
defendants.
Following the Keith decision, the district court lifted its stay and held that the Act vio-
lated a provision of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution which grants authority over the public
school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education rather than the legisla-
ture. See LA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified
this constitutional question to the Louisiana Supreme Court which found no violation of the
constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 705 (La. 1983). The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals then remanded the case to the district court with instructions to address the federal
constitutional questions.
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When at last the district court was instructed to address the fed-
eral constitutional questions, the plaintiffs moved for summary
judgment contending that the statute violated the establishment
clause of the first amendment as a matter of law.146 The plaintiffs
argued that the Act was simply another effort by Christian Funda-
mentalists to incorporate into the public school curricula the Bibli-
cal theory of creation described in the Book of Genesis. Con-
versely, the state contended that the purpose and the effect of the
Act was to promote academic freedom and that the Act was nar-
rowly drawn to serve this legitimate secular interest. 147
The district court granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment mo-
tion, declared the Act unconstitutional and enjoined its implemen-
tation. 48 The court reasoned that the doctrine of creation-science
necessarily entailed teaching the existence of a divine creator. The
concept of a divine creator was recognized by the court as an in-
herently religious tenet. Thus, the court held that the purpose of
the Act was to promote religious belief, and the implementation of
the Act would have the effect of establishing religion in contraven-
tion of the first amendment. 49
The district court's conclusions regarding the Act were immedi-
ately challenged by the state on appeal. In Aguillard v. Ed-
wards,50 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's determination of unconstitutionality. However, the Court of
Appeals only addressed the first prong of the Lemon v. Kurtz-
man15 test, specifically, whether the Act had a secular legislative
purpose.15 2 Unlike the court in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Edu-
cation,15 3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to inquire into
the primary effect of the Act and the possibility of excessive gov-
ernmental entanglement with religion. Additionally, the court re-
fused to engage in an elaborate discussion of scientific methodol-
ogy and its application to creation-science.
Initially, the court recognized that the states have the general
"right to prescribe the academic curricula of their public school
146. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985).
147. Id. at 429.
148. Id. at 426.
149. Id. at 429.
150. 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
151. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
152. Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1254.
153. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
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systems," and that courts are, therefore, required to exercise great
care and restraint in matters regarding the operation of public
schools. 154 However, the "state's right to prescribe its public school
curriculum [is not absolute and] is limited to the extent that it
may not compel or prohibit the teaching of a theory or doctrine for
religious reasons.' 1 55 Thus, the intervention of the courts in the
operation of public schools is justified where it is necessary to pro-
tect against violations of the first amendment religion clauses.
The court began its analysis by applying the three-part estab-
lishment clause test set forth in Lemon to the Balanced Treatment
Act. However, the court only considered the purpose prong of the
Lemon test as no consideration of the second or third criteria was
necessary if the statute's purpose was not clearly secular.'56 If the
legislature's enactment of the Balanced Treatment Act was domi-
nated by a religious purpose, the secular purpose requirement was
"not satisfied by the mere existence of some secular purpose.' 15 7 A
legislative enactment fails the secular purpose test if the state's ac-
tual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.'58
In applying the secular purpose requirement to the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment Act, the court initially noted that, irrespec-
tive of whether it is fully supported by scientific evidence, the the-
ory of creation is a religious belief. ' 9 This conclusion was, in part,
based upon the centrality of the theory of creation to the tenets of
many religions. The court also based its conclusion upon the his-
torical context of the Act. Specifically, the court recognized the of-
fensiveness of the theory of evolution to religious fundamentalists
because of the irreconcilability of evolution with the Biblical ac-
count of the origin of man. 60 Finally, the court recognized the ex-
154. Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1254.
155. Id. at 1255.
156. Id. The court cited Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) in support of its refusal to
consider the effect and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test if the Act was not deemed to
have a clearly secular purpose.
157. Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1256.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. This statement seems to ignore those members of the scientific community who,
although firm supporters of evolutionary theory, also believe that it is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the existence of a Supreme Being. The court apparently divides the world into
two alternative and mutually exclusive camps of those who "believe that God, in a miracu-
lous manner, created all matter and energy" and "[t]hose who insist that the universe just
grew, by accident, from a mass of hot gases without the direction or help of a Creator."
BOARDMAN, WORLDS WITHOUT END 61 (1971) quoted in McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1266 n.22.
As such, the court's statement merely reinforces the "contrived dualism [of creationist
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tensive efforts of Christian Fundamentalists to discredit the theory
of evolution through the promotion of their own religious beliefs. 161
After determining that the theory of creation is a religious belief,
the Fifth Circuit considered the stated purpose of the Act, specifi-
cally, the protection of academic freedom in the classroom. The
court found the statements of secular purpose made in the legisla-
tive hearing by the Act's sponsor and supporters to be self-serving
and insufficient to avoid conflict with the first amendment.16 2 Ad-
ditionally, the court found the Act inconsistent with its stated pur-
pose of academic freedom. 63 The principle of academic freedom
was designed to grant teachers the liberty to instruct students in
"that which they deem[ed] to be appropriate in the exercise of
their professional judgment. 1' 64 This principle discourages state in-
terference in matters of curriculum, subject matter and method of
presentation. The court considered the compulsory instruction in-
herent in the Balanced Treatment Act to be inconsistent with
these principles of academic freedom. The court therefore rejected
the statement of purpose contained in section 286.2 of the Act.'
Finally, the court found the statute to be inconsistent with the
promotion of creation-science as a genuine academic interest. If
the actual purpose of the Act was to advance or to encourage the
study of creation-science, the court concluded that the Act would
have required instruction in creation-science irrespective of
whether evolutionary instruction was offered.' 66 The Act's require-
ment that creation-science be taught only if evolution was taught
appeared to the court to be a clear attempt to discredit evolution
by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of
creationism. 167 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Louisi-
ana Balanced Treatment Act had as its primary purpose the ad-
vancement of a particular religious belief, and, as such, was
unconstitutional.
thought] ... which has no scientific factual basis [and] ... assumes only two explanations
for the origins of life and existence of man, plants and animals .... " McLean, 529 F.
Supp. at 1266.
161. Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1256.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1257.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. Unlike McLean, however, the Fifth Circuit stated that its opinion should not "be
taken to reflect adversely upon creation-science either as a religious belief or a scientific
theory." Id.
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Despite the restraint of the court in striking down the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment Act, several of the judges, on suggestion for
rehearing en banc, filed a vigorous dissent to the majority opinion.
The dissenters argued that the Act, unlike other establishment
clause cases, had no direct religious reference whatsoever and
merely required a complete presentation of all scientific theories
regarding the origins of man." 8 The dissenters found the religious
motives of the Act's sponsor and supporters to be irrelevant and
strongly condemned the majority's examination of matters relating
to legislative intent beyond the statement of purpose contained
within the Act.169 Instead of examining the Act's words and its
stated legislative purpose, the majority was deemed to have im-
posed its subjective notions as to the true sentiments of the Louisi-
ana legislature at the time of the passage of the Act based upon
the underlying religious motivation of several of its members. This
approach was condemned as making "a farce of the judicial exer-
cise of discerning legislative intent.' 17 0 The result, according to the
dissenters, was that evolution would be misrepresented as fact
rather than theory, and the state would be powerless to prevent
such misrepresentations. 7' It was these conflicting statutory inter-
pretations that confronted the United States Supreme Court in its
decision in Edwards v. Aguillard 72
D. Edwards v. Aguillard
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that
the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act contravened the establish-
168. Aguillard v. Edwards, 778 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1985) (on suggestion for rehearing
en banc). As in the majority opinion, the dissent did not address the effect and entangle-
ment prongs of the Lemon test.
169. Id. -
170. Id.
171. Id. at 228. In a pointed response to the dissent, Judge E. Grady Jolly, the author of
the majority opinion, stated:
I offer my apologies to the majority of this court for aligning it with the forces of
darkness and anti-truth . . . .I do not personally align myself with the dissenters in
their commitment to the search for eternal truth through state edicts . . . .I com-
mend to the dissenters a serious rereading of the majority opinion that they may
recognize the hyperbole of the opinion in which they join. . . .I respectfully submit,
the panel opinion speaks for itself, modestly and moderately, if one will allow its
words to be carefully heard.
Id.
172. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
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ment clause.'1 3 Employing the purpose prong of the establishment
clause test set forth in Lemon, the Court concluded that the Loui-
siana Balanced Treatment Act was designed either to promote the
theory of creation-science, which embodied particular religious be-
liefs, or prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory on the basis
that it was disfavored by certain sects. 17 4 The Court was unable to
find any clear secular purpose for the Act which would mandate a
reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision. Instead, the Court found
the purported secular purpose of promoting academic freedom to
be a sham.175 The Court reached this decision by examining the
compulsory provisions of the Act, the disparate treatment of evolu-
tion-science and creation-science contained within the Act and the
underlying legislative history.17 6
Initially, the Court found that the purported goal of the Act to
promote academic freedom was defeated by the compulsory provi-
sions of the Act outlawing the teaching of evolution or requiring
that creation-science be taught whenever evolution was taught.
These compulsory provisions were deemed to actually diminish ac-
ademic freedom by depriving Louisiana public school teachers of
the flexibility to teach evolution without also teaching creation-sci-
ence. 17 The public school teacher would have no choice but to pre-
sent both models even if the teacher determined that such a dual
presentation would result in less effective and comprehensive in-
struction in science.'1 8 Instead of promoting academic freedom and
broadening the science curriculum, the Court found that the pur-
pose of the Act's sponsor was to restrict academic freedom and
narrow the science curriculum. 1 9 Thus, the Court deemed the
compulsion inherent in the mandatory instruction provisions of the
Act and constrictive purpose of the Act's sponsor to be incongru-
ent with the principles of academic freedom and a comprehensive
scientific education. 180
173. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
174. Id. at 2582. The basis for the Court's conclusion that the Louisiana Balanced Treat-
ment Act promoted the theory of creation-science, which embodied particular religious ten-
ets or prohibited the teaching of a scientific theory disfavored by certain religious sects,
were §§ 286.4A and 286.5 of the Act which required that creation-science be taught when-
ever evolution was taught.
175. Id. at 2579.
176. Id. at 2579-80.
177. Id. at 2579 n.6.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2579. This conclusion was based upon a statement made by Senator Bill Keith
during a legislative hearing held on the Act wherein Senator Keith stated "[m]y preference
would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be taught." Id.
180. Id. at 2579 n.6.
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The Court also rejected the state's argument that the goal of
"basic fairness" was furthered by the Act. Instead, the Court found
that the Act contained a "discriminatory preference for the teach-
ing of creation-science and against the teaching of evolution." '181
This discriminatory preference was inherent in portions of the Act
which required the development of curriculum guides and research
services for instruction in creation-science, but not for instruction
in evolution.1 8 2 Additionally, the Act forbade public school admin-
istrators from discriminating against anyone who chose to be a
''creation-scientist" or to teach "creationism" without providing
for similar safeguards for those who chose to teach evolution or
any other noncreation-science theory, or who refused to teach crea-
tion-science.18s This discriminatory preference for creation-science
was deemed to diminish academic freedom and undermine the
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction by dis-
couraging the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of
mankind.18 4
Finally, the Court found that the purported secular purpose of
furthering academic freedom was inconsistent with the purpose of
the Act as expressed in its legislative history. The Court concluded
that the legislative history revealed that the term "creation-sci-
ence," as contemplated by the Louisiana legislature, embodied the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the
creation of humankind.1 5 The Court based this conclusion upon
testimony offered by experts on creation-science at legislative hear-
ings' 6 and statements made by the Act's sponsor and other legisla-
181. Id.
182. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.7(A)-(B) (West 1982). Additionally, only creation-
scientists were permitted to serve on the panel responsible for the adoption and supplying
of resource services necessary for the implementation of the Act.
183. See id. § 17:286.4(C).
184. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
185. Id. at 2582.
186. Id. at 2581-82. In this portion of the opinion, the Court refers directly to the testi-
mony of Edward Boudreaux, a leading expert on creation-science who testified at the legis-
lative hearings preceding the enactment of the Balanced Treatment Act. Specifically, in the
course of his testimony, Mr. Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation-science in terms of a
theory that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. Specifically, Mr. Boudreaux
noted that the theory of creation-science is based upon the high probability that life was
"created by an intelligent mind" and "require[d] the direct involvement of a supernatural
intelligence." Id. at 2581 n.12.
[Vol. 22:187
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tors supporting the Act. 187 The Court also determined the underly-
ing religious nature of the Act through statements made by the
Act's sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, during legislative hearings
wherein he expressed his disdain for the theory of evolution due to
its inconsistency with his own personal religious beliefs and its al-
leged consonance with atheistic and secular humanistic beliefs. 8s
The testimony and statements contained within the legislative
history, when combined with creation-science's inherent reliance
upon supernaturalism, led the Court to conclude that the Act's pri-
mary purpose was to modify the public school science curriculum
in order to provide an advantage to a particular religious doctrine
that rejects the theory of evolution in its entirety.' As such, the
Court abandoned its policy of deference to statutory articulations
of secular purpose and found that the Louisiana Balanced Treat-
ment Act's purported statement of secular purpose was an uncon-
stitutional subterfuge for the advancement of a particular religious
doctrine. 90
187. Id. at 2581-82. In reviewing statements of legislators made contemporaneously with
the passage of the Act, the Court specifically focused on the Act's sponsor, Senator Bill
Keith. The Court found particularly relevant Senator Keith's restatement of his under-
standing of the theory of creation-science which embodied his view that "a creator, however
you define a creator, was responsible for everything that is in this world." Id. The Court also
focused on the statements of other Senators and representatives relating to the use of the
Bible and other religious texts in classrooms to support the creation-science theory and the
existence of God as an established scientific fact. Id. at 1258 n.13.
188. Id. at 2582. The Court focused on statements made by Senator Keith during the
course of legislative hearings "that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the
support that evolution supplied to views contrary to his own religious beliefs." Id. Specifi-
cally, Senator Keith noted that evolution was contrary to his family's religious beliefs and
advanced religions contrary to his own. According to Senator Keith, the theory of evolution
was consonant with "cardinal principles of religious humanism, secular humanism, theologi-
cal liberalism, [and] atheism." Id. Senator Keith proposed that evidence supporting crea-
tion-science be included in the public school curriculum in order to "redress the fact that
the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what [the Senator] characterized as reli-
gious beliefs antithetical to his own." Id. From these statements, the Court concluded that
the Act sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of religious views that
were antagonistic to the theory of evolution. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, found that
the Louisiana legislature "acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public
school curriculum to make it compatible with a particular religious belief: the 'divine crea-
tion of man.'" Id. at 2588 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell also found that the theory
of creation-science necessarily included a belief in the existence of a supernatural creator.
As such, despite the Act's alleged concentration on the "scientific evidences" for creation
and inferences therefrom, the concept of a supernatural or divine creator was deemed mani-
festly religious. Justice Powell found that this concept did not shed its religiosity merely
because it was presented in the Act as science. Id. at 2585 (Powell, J., concurring).
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E. An Analysis of the Opinion: Secular Purpose and the Under-
lying Religiosity of Creation-Science
The ultimate result of the decisions in the Edwards v. Aguil-
lard'91 and McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education'9 2 cases can
be characterized in no other way than as a crushing and bitter de-
feat for the forces of Christian Fundamentalism seeking scientific
legitimacy and recognition for their particular beliefs regarding the
origins of humankind. The allegedly benevolent egalitarianism and
beneficial purpose of the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act'9 3 was
flatly rejected by a majority of the United States Supreme Court,
which found unconstitutional preferences in the Act's text and
rampant religiosity in the theory of creation-science and in the ill-
advised legislative discourse of its supporters.'94 The McLean court
went even farther in finding that the Arkansas Balanced Treat-
ment Act violated the effect and entanglement prongs of the
Lemon test as well as the purpose prong.' 5 A more complete rejec-
tion of these Acts can hardly be imagined.
The Edwards and McLean courts were undoubtedly correct in
their conclusion that the overriding purpose of the balanced treat-
ment legislation was to introduce the supernatural Biblical version
of creation into the public school curricula. The legislative histories
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice White affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' determination of unconstitutionality stating that the Court of Appeals' interpretation
was a rational construction of the statute which contained no manifest errors, omissions or
misinterpretations. Id. at 2591 (White, J., concurring).
In a vehement dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, attacked the
majority's conclusion that statutes enacted by legislators acting upon their personal religious
convictions evidenced an unconstitutional purpose in violation of the establishment clause.
Id. at 2591 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters also refused to presume that the Act's
purpose was to advance religion merely because it coincided with the tenets of a particular
religious belief in a happenstance manner or because it could be deemed to benefit religion.
Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissenters stated that there was no ade-
quate basis contained within the legislative history of the Act for disbelieving the secular
purpose expressly set forth therein. Even if the Act was adopted for the purpose of fostering
Christian Fundamentalist beliefs, such purpose alone would not suffice to invalidate the Act,
so long as there was a genuine secular purpose as well. Id. at 2604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This secular purpose, the protection of academic freedom, was clearly set forth in the Act.
As there was no adequate basis for disregarding the express secular purpose set forth in the
Act, the dissenters concluded that the Act had a constitutional secular purpose consistent
with the strictures of the establishment clause. Id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
192. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 173-190.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 77-122.
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of the Acts were permeated with sectarian references and unbri-
dled hostility directed towards evolution. These histories, when
combined with the disparate treatment, intrusive and exclusive na-
ture of the balanced treatment requirements to the science curric-
ulum,"8 6 and the historical link between the teachings of certain
religious denominations and the teachings of evolution, clearly viti-
ate the stated secular purpose of the Acts. The inescapable links
between the tenets of creation-science and those of Christian Fun-
damentalist religious dogma lead to the conclusion that the only
real effect of the balanced treatment acts was the advancement of
religion. Finally, the constant governmental monitoring of teachers
and course materials necessary to ensure proper presentation of
evolution and creation-science would undoubtedly result in an ex-
cessive entanglement of government in questions concerning
religion. 197
Each of these conclusions can be reached from a study of the
Arkansas and Louisiana Balanced Treatment Acts. The conclu-
sions are based in some degree upon the sectarian versus scientific
nature of the creation-science model. Therefore, it is appropriate
to examine the underlying nature of the creation-science theory
based upon universally accepted generalities as to the characteris-
tics of modern science.
If, as contended by its supporters, creation-science is truly "sci-
entific" within the essence of the modern scientific method, then it
is clearly within the power of the legislature or local public school
administration to mandate its instruction in the public schools. As-
suming this scientific characterization of creation-science to be cor-
rect, instruction in creation-science would not have as its primary
purpose or effect the promotion or establishment of religion. At
best, the promotion of Fundamentalist Christian religious doc-
196. The exclusive nature of the balanced treatment requirement to the public school
science curriculum was recognized by both the McLean and Edwards courts. In McLean,
the balanced treatment requirement was found to be an unprecedented intrusion into the
school curriculum based upon the fact that the only information required to be taught in
Arkansas' schools prior to the enactment of the Balanced Treatment Act was alcohol and
narcotics use, natural resource conservation, bird week, fire prevention and flag etiquette.
McLean, 529 F. Supp 1255, 1264 n.16. The Court in Edwards found the Louisiana Balanced
Treatment Act to suffer from the same intrusive malady. Specifically, the Court found none
of the other statutory provisions regarding mandatory courses of study in Louisiana public
schools to contain an equal time requirement for opposing opinions within a specific area of
learning as required by the Balanced Treatment Act. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2579 n.7.
197. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272. The Edwards court was not required to answer the
question of excessive governmental entanglement. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578.
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trines closely affiliated with the creation-science theory would be
an accidental or secondary effect. Such an accidental or secondary
purpose or effect is not an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion.198 As a recognized scientific theory, instruction in creation-
science would also not excessively entangle the state in questions
of religious doctrine.
Conversely, if creation-science is deemed to be sectarian dogma
disguised as scientific theory, its required instruction in public
schools at the behest of the legislature or local public school ad-
ministration would presumably be unconstitutional as its primary
purpose would be to establish certain Fundamentalist Christian
beliefs. Additionally, although not addressed by the Court in Ed-
wards, there is little doubt that if one adheres to the sectarian
point of reference with regard to creation-science, its instruction in
the public schools would also be unconstitutional as its primary
effect would be an establishment of religion. Finally, any attempt
to teach it would require extensive monitoring of classrooms to
prevent religious references and impermissibly entangle the state
in sensitive theological debates.
Although subjects as amorphous as science may, in some aspects,
defy definition or at least be subject to reasonable disagreement,
certain fundamentally accepted principles deemed to capture the
essence of the modern scientific method can be gleaned from a
study of modern science. 199 These basic principles, while general
and far ranging in their scope, are substantive and not so unduly
vague as to be unworkable. Considering the complexities and diffi-
culties often encountered in characterizing the human experience,
especially when that experience is rushing boldly toward new hori-
zons as modern science appears to be, these general principles
most adequately describe the principal features of the modern sci-
entific method in a workable fashion.
Initially, there can be little or no dispute with regard to the reli-
ance of the modern scientific method upon principles of natural
law. Specifically, modern science is guided and explainable by ref-
erence to natural law. Science limits itself to analysis of empirical
data collected from the workings of nature and avoids discussion of
ultimate values. 00 This empirical data forms the basis of scientific
198. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
199. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267.
200. Note, supra note 4, at 444.
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hypotheses that "explain observed phenomena by relating them to
natural conditions that can account for their occurrence. '"20 1 The
substantive body of scientific thought is made up of arguments
that have been deduced from observation and the collection and
study of evidence gathered from nature. As such, science is a neu-
tral tool with which to relate observations and data within the nat-
ural world to other observations and data. This emphasis upon ex-
planations within the bounds of the natural world precludes
science from invoking supernatural causes to explain nature. Theo-
ries relying upon the intervention of supernatural forces are not
within the definition of the modern scientific method as they are
based upon forces which operate outside of the bounds of natural
law.20 2  These forces are simply incapable of objective
verification.203
Contrary to the modern scientific method, creation-science is not
guided and explainable by reference to natural law. Instead, crea-
tion-science relies upon the intervention of unverifiable supernatu-
ral forces. The essential nature of this supernatural intervention to
creation-science as set forth in the Louisiana Balanced Treatment
Act was recognized by several witnesses who testified on behalf of
the Act. Specifically, the state's leading expert on creation-science,
Edward Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that one of
the tenets of creation-science was a "high probability that life was
'created by an intelligent mind.'-2o4 In addition to Mr. Bou-
dreaux's testimony, the legislative sponsors of the Louisiana Bal-
anced Treatment Act also cited testimony from other experts
which recognized the centrality of supernatural intervention to the
creation-science model.2" 5 The legislative history of the Louisiana
Balanced Treatment Act therefore clearly reveals that creation-sci-
ence, as defined in the Act, embodied the belief that supernatural
forces were responsible for the creation of mankind.
This reliance upon supernatural intervention is entirely different
from the reliance of modern science upon principles of natural law.
Explanations such as those relied upon by creation-scientists
201. Note, supra note 44, at 395.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 396 n.131.
204. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2581.
205. For example, Luther Sunderland, one of the lead witnesses at the hearings held by
the Louisiana Legislature regarding the Act, described creation-science as postulating that
"everything was created by some intelligence or power external to the universe." Id. at 2581
n.12.
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which depend upon the whimsical operation and intervention of
forces external to the universe which are not guided or explainable
by reference to natural law are clearly not scientific. Instead, this
reliance "bear[s] the unmistakable markings of an establishment-
religion."206
The modern scientific method also recognizes that explanations
reached through utilization of the method must be testable
through experimentation. Scientific theories, deduced from obser-
vations and collected data, are tested through experimentation in
order to reveal flaws within the theories. °1 In the absence of exper-
imentation, there are no other reliable standards with which to test
hypotheses.
Theories that rely upon explanations which require supernatural
intervention are incapable of verification through experimentation
and observation. 08 There are simply no known objective, as op-
posed to subjective, experiments by which to validate supernatu-
ralism. Supporters of the theory of creation-science have conceded
that this part of the theory is "inaccessible to the scientific
method"20 9 and suggest that "[t]he Creator does not create at the
whim of a scientist. '210 Leaving such self-serving platitudes aside,
the conclusion is inescapable that forces which admittedly operate
outside the scope of natural law and defy conventional explanation
for their operation cannot be the subject matter of observation or
experimentation. Thus, once again, the element of supernatural in-
tervention essential to the creation-science theory places it outside
the scope of the modern scientific method.
Finally, the conclusions reached and theories formulated
through utilization of the modern scientific method are tentative
and falsifiable. New scientific theories are accepted to the degree
that they help solve problems and give answers that are indepen-
206. Note, supra note 4, at 455.
207. Note, supra note 44, at 395.
208. The reliance upon supernatural explanations and the incapability of verification of
such explanations through experimentation and observation are freely admitted by creation-
ist writers. For example, Duane Gish, the Associate Director of the Institute for Creation
Research, has stated that "[w]e do not know how the Creator created, what processes He
used, for He used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural uni-
verse. . . . We cannot discover by scientific investigation anything about the creative
processes used by the Creator." D. GISH, EvOLUTION? THE FOSSILS SAY No! 42 (1978),
quoted in McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267 n.25 (emphasis added).
209. INSTITUTE FOR CREATION RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 5.
210. Id.
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dently provable. Scientists perform experiments to determine
whether certain phenomena predicted by their theories actually oc-
cur. If the predicted phenomena fail to occur, then the theory has
been falsified.211 In such case, the theory must be modified or
abandoned entirely.212 Thus, all conclusions reached through the
application of the modern scientific method are tentative and sub-
ject to change in light of new observations and experimentations.
Due to these constant revisions and modifications, science can
never represent absolute truth. Presently existing theories are al-
ways subject to modification or replacement by new theories which
may explain more data than the presently recognized theories. In-
deed, it has been stated that "the great strength of the scientific
method is its open-minded spirit of inquiry. ' 213 On the other hand,
theories which seek to find scientific evidence for immutable con-
clusions are not scientific. Theories that are dogmatic and never
subject to revision are not scientific theories. Whatever they may
be, they lack the flexibility necessary to the modern scientific
method.
The methodology employed by creation-scientists is as unscien-
tific as their use of supernatural intervention. As stated by the
court in McLean, "[a] scientific theory must be tentative and al-
ways subject to revision or abandonment in light of facts that are
inconsistent with, or falsify, the theory. The theory that is by its
own terms dogmatic, absolutist and never subject to revision is not
a scientific theory."214
The methods employed by creation-scientists completely fail to
weigh scientific data gathered through observation and experimen-
tation against other data and draw conclusions from the results.
Instead, the creation-scientists adopt the literal reading of the
Book of Genesis and attempt to find scientific evidence for it. Such
attempts consist almost entirely of attacks on evolution "through a
rehash of data and theories which have been before the scientific
211. Falsifiability has been described as "an important corollary to the requirement of
testability. If it is possible to imagine an experiment or observation that would establish
whether an empirical statement is false, then that statement can be considered scientific."
Note, supra note 44, at 395. Falsifiable theories are not dependent upon supernatural expla-
nations which cannot be proven by reference to natural law.
212. Id. at 395-96.
213. Note, Evolution, Creationism and the Religion Clauses, 46 ALB. L. REv. 897, 927
(1982).
214. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1269.
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community for decades.12 15 Additionally, evidence or observations
which appear to be inconsistent with the theory of evolution are
deemed by creation-scientists to constitute evidence supportive of
their theory that life was the product of a creator.216 However, the
"leap of faith" required to interpret this "evidence" as indicative
of sudden creation from nothing without any additional affirmative
evidential basis is difficult at best and one this author would not
care to make. This methodology-of attempting to prove creation-
science solely by attacking evolution-is not based on natural law,
is not testable through experimentation and thus is unscientific.
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn by Creationists through the
use of this methodology "are not tentative because when con-
fronted with data that contradicts their position, creation-scien-
tists tend to discount it or ignore it. ' 217 Creationists begin with
complete faith in their literal interpretation of Genesis and no
amount of conflicting empirical data ever causes them to question
or modify their beliefs.21 Thus, it has been noted that creation-
scientists "have the 'answer' before they begin to research and seek
only to substantiate their view, not to explain the unknown."2 19
Such absolutist and rigid attitudes hardly comport with the tenta-
tive and falsifiable nature of science. These beliefs resemble the
tenets of religious dogma much more than the open-minded spirit
of inquiry characteristic of the modern scientific method.
In examining the nature of creation-science, the balanced treat-
ment acts and their underlying legislative history as a whole, it be-
comes obvious that creation-science is nothing more than Christian
Fundamentalism disguised as science in order to introduce the
Biblical version of Creation into the public school curricula. Al-
215. Id. at 1270. A leading writer in this area has characterized the anti-evolutionary na-
ture of creation-science:
Creation-science aims almost exclusively at dismantling the evolutionary theory that
is currently accepted by the vast majority of chemists and biologists. Unlike other
sciences, it offers no fresh observations of nature . . . . Instead, creationists quote
leading evolutionary scholars and try to show that their work is unscientific or that
evolutionists do not agree about evolution.
Steinhart, Fundamentals, AUDUBON, Sept. 1981, at 5, 8.
216. Note, supra note 44, at 397.
217. Id. at 398.
218. The "research" methods utilized by creation-scientists and the conclusions drawn
therefrom have been best characterized as follows: "I can envision observations and experi-
ments that would disprove any evolutionary theory I know, but I cannot imagine what po-
tential data could lead creationists to abandon their beliefs. Unbeatable systems are dogma,
not science." Gould, Evolution as Fact and Theory, DISCOVER, May 1981 at 34-35.
219. Note, supra note 213, at 930-31.
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though everyone may "approach a scientific inquiry in any fashion
they choose," 2 0 they may not proclaim their methodology scien-
tific if it is based on close-minded declarations, self-serving super-
naturalism and inflexible finality.22' Through manipulation and vo-
cabular blasphemy, supporters of creation-science in the Arkansas
and Louisiana balanced treatment acts repackaged their doctrinal
rigidity and theistic intolerance as science in an effort to avoid the
judicial defeats suffered in the 1960's and 1970's. However, the
state and the public school system have a duty to present knowl-
edge developed by a responsible academic community regardless of
its alleged inconsistency with religious dogma. In recognizing the
true nature and purpose of the balanced treatment acts, the courts
in McLean and Edwards prevented the states from diverging from
these professional standards of education.
V. CONCLUSION
The public school classroom has been recognized as a "market-
place of ideas."' Its central role in promoting learning, inquiry
and tolerance by presenting conflicting ideas "well supported by
the academic community and pertinent to the course of study pro-
moted by the state '223 should remain unchanged. Undoubtedly,
there are dangers inherent in decisions such as those in McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education24 and Edwards v. Aguillard225
which strictly define subjects and consequently limit the scope of
inquiry within the public school classroom. Many ideas worthy of
study may be excluded from the curriculum because they have
been rejected by the intellectual community or comport too closely
with the theological tenets of some religious belief. This objection
has been raised to the court's definition of science in the McLean
opinion and may be raised to the United States Supreme Court's
rejection of creation-science in Edwards.226 However, this objection
is unwarranted for several reasons.
Courts have traditionally exercised judicial restraint in interfer-
220. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1269.
221. Id.
222. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
223. Note, supra note 4, at 448.
224. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
225. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
226. See Lines, supra note 96, at 50.
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ing with decisions regarding local educational policies. The states
and local school boards possess a large degree of authority over
daily operational decisions and the curricula within their educa-
tional institutions. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"[c]ourts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts
which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do
not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values. '227
In any case, such intervention requires judicial care and
restraint.128
However, the courts should not hesitate to intervene where
school policies directly violate basic constitutional guarantees, for
"[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools. '229 The Ar-
kansas23° and Louisiana231 balanced treatment acts implicated the
establishment clause. Therefore, judicial interposition was justi-
fied, and the United States Supreme Court in Edwards exercised
considerable restraint in examining the nature of creation-science
and its underlying legislative history before reaching its conclu-
sions.23 2 The American system of government ultimately depends
on the exercise of restraint by all three of its branches. To deny
the courts the exercise of jurisdiction over a controversy implicat-
ing basic constitutional values for the sole reason that they may
abuse their judicial discretion sometime in the future is to create
an unworkable and nonfunctional system of government.
Furthermore, there are few subjects in the public school curric-
ula which necessitate such judicial intervention. Historically, the
Creationists' attacks on evolution have been in the context of sci-
ence classes. It is unlikely that this conflict will directly spill over
into other subjects and thus necessitate judicial intervention in all
subjects in the public school curricula.
Additionally, some subjects, by their very nature, are outside the
arena of potential conflict. For example, it is very difficult to imag-
ine Creationists demanding equal time in such courses as mathe-
matics, foreign languages and geography. Indeed, there is no reason
227. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
228. Id.
229. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
230. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1663 to -1670 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1 to .7 (West 1982).
232. Cf. McLean, 529 F. Supp at 1267-72. The McLean court engaged in a considerable
discussion of creation-science as a "non-science."
[Vol. 22:187
FROM Scopes TO Edwards
for equal time in these courses since the evolutionary theory is not
presented in them. The courts, therefore, will not be required to
intervene or provide definitions of every course of study taught in
the public schools in order to remove impermissible religious refer-
ences from the curricula.
The McLean and Edwards opinions also serve to prevent divi-
siveness over religious issues in the public school system. As noted
in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Edwards and un-
abashedly ignored by the dissenters, "there is an enormous variety
of religions in the United States. According to the Encyclopedia of
American Religions, there are 1,347 religious organizations in the
United States."23 These religious organizations include groups as
diverse as Buddhists, Greek Orthodox, Jews, Muslims, Protestants
and Roman Catholics. The multi-religious nature of present-day
America demonstrates the wisdom of the Court's decision in Ed-
wards prohibiting the structuring of the public school curriculum
in order to make it compatible with the religious beliefs of one par-
ticular sect. Instead, by preventing this restructuring, the Court
has recognized the ultimate purpose of the establishment clause:
the accommodation of competing religious beliefs with governmen-
tal preference for none.23 4
Additionally, the obsession of supporters of creation-science with
scientific recognition and legitimacy in the public school classroom
in the last decade is unnecessary given the current status of reli-
gious instruction in public schools. Contrary to the apparent intent
of creation-science supporters, the labeling of a particular body of
thought as science does not necessarily lead to greater acceptabil-
ity within and without the scientific community. To the contrary,
such reclassification may result in greater alienation of the public
which, as a whole, tends to view its religious beliefs in a more per-
sonal manner than theories and hypotheses are viewed in the sci-
entific community.
The courts' decisions in McLean and Edwards did not prohibit
any mention of the Bible or Creationist theories outside of science
classes. As recognized by Justice Powell, the nation's religious heri-
tage is a proper subject matter in the public school curricula.3 5
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Bible can be used as a
233. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2589 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 2589.
235. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (Powell, J., concurring).
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historical tool in public school courses about religion as long as the
presentation is conducted in a secular and neutral fashion. ss Crea-
tionism may therefore be appropriate for public school classes in
comparative religions, humanities or religious history. These
courses may be constitutionally taught if "presented objectively as
part of a secular program of education. 23 7 Creationist concepts
most certainly have a place in the public school curricula as philos-
ophy. Given this long history of recognition in the public school
curricula, the vigorous quest for inclusion within the science curric-
ula seems wasteful and duplicative. Additionally, as demonstrated
above, teaching such religious philosophies as the product of genu-
ine scientific inquiry can only undermine effective science
instruction.
The judicial rejection of the balanced treatment acts in McLean
and Edwards signals the end to only one aspect of the creation-
science/evolution controversy. Despite the decisiveness of the opin-
ions in McLean and Edwards, the controversy over creation-sci-
ence and evolutionary theory is likely to continue. Creationists
consider the introduction of creation-science into the public
schools as an integral part of their ministry. 38 Thus, with each new
judicial decision, Creationists have modified their approach in or-
der to avoid the mandates of these decisions. This commitment to
creation-science is not likely to end as a result of the Edwards
opinion.
The recent failure of Creationists in the Supreme Court makes it
unlikely that the Creationists will repeat their efforts to encourage
enactment of modified balanced treatment acts in an effort to
avoid the fate of the Arkansas and Louisiana acts. In addition to
the likely failure of a modified act, such efforts attract too much
publicity. Instead, Creationists will turn their attention to their
strongest resource--"grassroots organization"-and begin to pres-
sure local school boards to adopt publications sympathetic to the
236. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963), where the Court stated:
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of com-
parative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary
and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of educa-
tion, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.
Id.; see also Wiley v. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390, 395 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
237. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
238. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1260.
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creation-science viewpoint and lobby textbook publishers for equal
emphasis or dilution of evolutionary instruction.
Local school boards, and to a lesser degree, textbook publishers,
are vulnerable to Creationist tactics. Recent surveys indicate that a
majority of the public favors public school instruction in both crea-
tion-science and evolution.2 39 Although the results of the surveys
are irrelevant for constitutional purposes,240 such reasoning has lit-
tle impact at the local level where opinions may be stronger and
direct confrontation more likely. Pressure applied by the local con-
stituency, coupled with Creationist propaganda and a nonreligious,
credible presentation, may be enough to sway some school boards
into adopting pro-Creationist resolutions.
Once confronted with pressure applied by the local constituency
or, more often, by better organized Christian Fundamentalist orga-
nizations which may operate on a national level, the school board
has three alternatives. The board may pursue a course of indiffer-
ence and refuse to address the Creationists' clamor for inclusion in
the science curriculum. Alternatively, the board may capitulate to
the Creationists' demands and adopt a policy with a pro-Creation-
ist bias. Finally, the school board may resist the Creationists' de-
mands and pursue a responsible course independent of the views of
perhaps the majority of the community. The latter course is the
only educationally and constitutionally sound course. However,
this course requires great perseverance and resilience in the face of
often stubborn resistance and direct confrontation.
The initial alternative, the refusal by the local school board to
address Creationists' pressures for inclusion in the science curricu-
lum, is improper and unacceptable. Public education, by its very
nature, is an institution best managed at the local level. Thus, the
state and local school boards must necessarily exercise a large de-
gree of authority over operational decisions and the curricula. In-
difference and a refusal to address concerns relating to curricula
decisions constitutes a complete abdication by the local school
239. See Bird, supra note 49, at 162.
240. The McLean court answered this public opinion contention by stating:
The application and content of First Amendment principles are not determined by
public opinion polls or by a majority vote. Whether the proponents of the [Arkansas
Balanced Treatment Act] constitute the majority or minority is quite irrelevant ....
No group, no matter how large or small, may use the organs of government, of which
the public schools are the most conspicuous and influential, to foist its religious be-
liefs on others.
McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1274.
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board of its regulatory authority and responsibilities. A policy of
indifference is inconsistent with the historical purpose and func-
tion of school boards.
Capitulation to the demands of Creationists and adoption of a
policy with a pro-Creationist bias is also improper. As with the pol-
icy of indifference, a policy of appeasement constitutes an abdica-
tion by the local school board of its duty to create and maintain a
responsible and non-denominational curricula. Additionally, this
policy constitutes a surrender by the local school board of its sci-
ence curriculum to a multitude of religious organizations and influ-
ences. Finally, this policy also discourages legitimate instruction of
students in science and places new and impossible burdens upon
teachers.241
Initially, a policy of appeasement opens the door to a myriad of
recorded theories of Creation in the public school classroom. The
multiplicity of recorded theories of Creation held by all religious
sects imposes an impossible burden on the teacher attempting to
instruct students in this subject. Additionally, school boards and
personnel lacking detailed theological training are not qualified to
select from the available theories those which merit attention in
science classes.
A policy of appeasement also undermines responsible science in-
struction. The beliefs of most, if not all, religious denominations
include, to varying degrees, supernaturalism in the form of the ex-
istence of a divine creator and varying degrees of doctrinal adher-
ence. As demonstrated above, these concepts are clearly inherent
in the theory of creation-science. The introduction of supernatural-
ism and theistic rigidity into the science curriculum and its inevi-
table confusion with scientific methodology only serves to retard
responsible instruction in the scientific method. The methodology
of these two fields, religion and science, are entirely different.
Scientists base their conclusions upon theorization, experimenta-
tion and observation. Conversely, religious scholars rely primarily
upon supernaturalism, sectarian tradition and tenets of faith. To
suggest, in the context of the public school science course, that
these two methods are identical serves only to propagate the myth
foisted upon the public at large by Christian Fundamentalists
241. Davidow & Wilson, Wendell Bird's "Creation-Science"- "Newspeak" on the Assault
in the Secular Society, 9 N. Ky. L. REv. 207, 228 (1982).
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seeking to broaden their recognition and publicize their particular
message.
Finally, a policy of appeasement would create additional difficul-
ties for already overburdened teachers. In addition to acting as in-
structor, role model, child psychologist and, quite often, surrogate
parent, a policy of appeasement would require the public school
teacher to assume new roles as theologian and, more than likely,
instiller of religious values. Teachers would be required to gain
competence in all of the multifarious theories of Creation in order
to select theories worthy of classroom presentation. Additionally,
public school teachers would be required to exercise meticulous
care in the presentation of Creationist materials in order to avoid
impermissible religious instruction. Throughout their instruction
of students in the various theories of Creation, public school teach-
ers would undoubtedly be aware that their statements will be
closely monitored by school officials, parents, lawyers and, possi-
bly, the judiciary. This policy would result in self-censorship by
teachers and unacceptable loss of academic freedom in the public
school classroom. 2
42
The only acceptable school board policy is one of active resis-
tance to public pressure. This policy is preferable for several rea-
sons. Initially, this approach discourages judicial intervention into
hastily enacted and ill-conceived school policies which may directly
violate basic constitutional guarantees. For example, in the legisla-
tive context, the necessity of the sweeping nature of the court's
opinion in McLean could have been obviated had the Arkansas
legislature studied the constitutional implications of the Arkansas
Balanced Treatment Act. Instead, the legislature's rush to enact-
ment led to a broad-based constitutional rejection of the Act by
the court. Such judicial obliteration of statutes as a result of insuf-
ficient legislative study of their constitutional implications wastes
legislative and judicial resources. Any policy which reduces such
wastefulness can only be embraced by the legal and educational
community.
A policy of active resistance to the demands of Christian Funda-
mentalists also appropriately maintains a desirable separation be-
tween science instruction and instruction in religions. As demon-
strated above, scientists and theologians use radically different
242. Cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2. The purported legislative objective was the pro-
tection and growth of academic freedom.
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methodologies to address similar concerns. The continuation of
separate roles for religion and science in the public school class-
room, prevents the confusion of these different methodologies.
Finally, active resistance to the demands of Christian Funda-
mentalists prevents communal divisiveness on religious issues.
Rather than turning the classroom into an arena of religious con-
flict and sectarian rivalry, a policy of active resistance recognizes
the separateness of religious philosophy and scientific methodology
and attempts to address them equally in the context of humanities
and science courses respectively. More fundamentally, this policy
recognizes that the most appropriate place for religious instruction
lies not in the public school but, rather, in the home. In an era
when the public school has been subjected to increasing criticism
for its failure to act as a competent stepparent and disciplinarian
as well as educator, a policy which returns instruction in funda-
mental values to its rightful place should be encouraged by educa-
tors and the clergy alike.
It has been stated that "the unfortunate aspect of the creation-
ists' demand. . . is the possibility that school boards will respond
[to the controversy by ending the teaching of evolution in] . . . the
public schools under their control."243 Although such a result is un-
likely given the mandates of the Edwards opinion, it cannot be se-
riously questioned that the enormous amount of time and re-
sources devoted to this dispute has distracted those actively
participating in public school instruction from their duty of pro-
viding effective instruction in all subjects, including science. The
dispute has come full circle from the Tennessee Supreme Court's
decision upholding the absolute prohibition of evolutionary in-
struction in the public schools in 1927.244 The Creationists' ulti-
mate attempt to introduce their views into the public school class-
room in the form of allegedly content-neutral legislation for the
alleged secular purpose of promoting academic freedom has failed.
Given this defeat and the enormous educational, scientific and ju-
dicial resources devoted to this dispute throughout its history, on
the sixtieth anniversary of the Scopes v. State decision, 245 it is
time for educators to leave the courtroom and return to the
classroom.
243. Davidow & Wilson, supra note 241, at 228.
244. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
245. Id.
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